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THE EFFECT OF MRS WATTS’ TRIP TO FRANCE 
ON THE NATIONAL HEALTH SERVICE
Introduction
In the last ten years the European Court of Justice has delivered a series of consistent and
important judgments on the application of the law regarding free movement of services
and free movement of persons to health care.1 Despite protests from some governments—
especially those, such as the UK, running systems where health care is largely provided by
state-owned institutions and where provision is rationed to save money—the Court has
found that the institution paying for domestic health care, which may be an insurer or a
government, is prima facie obliged to pay for treatment abroad under certain
circumstances, notably where the care does not entail hospital treatment, or, even if it
does, where that treatment cannot be provided domestically without ‘undue delay’.2
For years the UK government disputed that these principles applied to the NHS,
because of its unique character, by comparison with the largely private and decentralised
health systems on the continent.3 When it became clear that this position could no longer
be sustained it changed the character of its defence, and began arguing for restrictive
application. It sought a broad interpretation of the exceptions that Community law allows
to all its general principles of free movement, and a narrow interpretation of ‘undue delay’.
These arguments were tested, and largely rejected, by the Court of Justice in Yvonne Watts
v Bedford Primary Care Trust, Secretary of State for Health.4 Both the patient-oriented
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content of the judgment, and the fact that it specifically addresses the NHS, mean that it
will have considerable impact in the UK. As well as highlighting the pressure for structural
reform of the NHS that Community law creates it also sketches the outline of future
litigation on patients’ rights.
The Facts
In 2002 Mrs Yvonne Watts was suffering from arthritis of the hips, her mobility was
severely limited, and she was in constant pain. The waiting time for the necessary surgery
in the area where she lived, Bedford, was around one year. She sought permission to go
to France to have the operation, but Bedford Primary Care Trust refused. Given that her
case was classified as ‘routine’, and the year’s waiting time fell ‘within the government’s
NHS plan targets’, it was not an ‘undue delay’.5 According to Article 22(2) of Regulation
1408/71, and Article 49 EC, which prohibits restrictions on the cross-border provision of
services, as interpreted by earlier judgments, where patients requiring hospital treatment6
cannot obtain this domestically without ‘undue delay’ they must be granted permission
to have the treatment abroad at the home authority’s expense. This much is established
law.7
Another examination of Mrs Watts in February 2003 concluded that her situation
had deteriorated and she required surgery ‘soon’, which meant within three or four
months. However, Bedford PCT said that the local waiting time for hip surgery had been
reduced to three or four months, and therefore this could be complied with. There was,
again, no question of undue delay, and no reason to grant her authorisation to go abroad.8
She went anyway, and had the surgery in March 2003, at her own expense, in
Abbeville, France. Then she came back and requested reimbursement, which was refused.
She had already begun judicial review of Bedford PCT’s refusal to grant authorisation, and
now she added a claim for the costs of her operation. The High Court found against her,
ruling that the three or four month wait which applied after her second examination was
not ‘undue delay’.9 She appealed to the Court of Appeal,10 which referred a number of
questions to the European Court of Justice. 
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Judgment and Commentary
What is ‘Undue Delay’?
The first question that the Court dealt with was the meaning of ‘undue delay’. It reiterated
that whether one looked on the refusal to authorise as a restriction on the free movement
of services (it discouraged Mrs Watts from receiving medical services abroad) within
Article 49, or as a matter within Regulation 1408/71, on the co-ordination of social
security systems, would make no difference to the answer.11
One consideration was the factors that need to be taken into account in deciding
what is ‘undue’. Bedford PCT clearly interpreted this to refer to delays exceeding the norm
for the NHS, or the government guidelines.12 In other words they looked at it in the
national and institutional context. By contrast, Mrs Watts preferred an interpretation
which focused exclusively on her medical needs and situation. The Court largely went
with Mrs Watts.13 It quoted Article 20 of Regulation 883/2004, which replaces 1408/71.14
This new regulation provides that authorisation must be given when treatment cannot be
provided ‘within a time-limit which is medically justifiable, taking into account his/her
current state of health and the probable course of his/her illness’.15 The emphasis is clearly
on the patient, rather than the system. Indeed, the Court’s final word on this question
was that refusal is only justified where the wait for treatment ‘does not exceed the period
which is acceptable on the basis of an objective medical assessment of the clinical needs
of the person concerned in the light of all the factors characterising his medical condition
at the time when the request for authorisation is made or renewed, as the case may be’.16
The Court also referred to the finding in earlier cases that the influence of the medical
condition on the patient’s wider life, notably their work, could be relevant.17 ‘Undue delay’
for a hairdresser with an elbow condition may be briefer than for some other people.
The UK government argued that the effect of this patient-centred, needs-based
approach to provision of health care would be to undermine the national authorities’
capacity to manage the system via the use of waiting lists.18 Such management is intended
to ensure that the most urgent cases are treated first, and to even out the flows of patients
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to enable hospital capacity to be used efficiently. However, the Court rejected these
arguments. Such a use of waiting lists was only legally problematic if the waiting time
was so long that it could not be clinically justified, and that for individual patients it was
medically indefensible.19 Was the UK government really arguing for its right to act against
the medical interests of patients waiting for treatment? It was, but it lost the point, and it
can do so no longer.
The Procedural Rights of Patients Seeking Permission for Treatment Abroad
Prior authorisation for hospital treatment abroad is usually a condition of
reimbursement, and the Court accepts this as legitimate,20 as it provides a degree of
predictability for the funding system or institution. However, the risk of an authorisation
procedure is that it will be slow and bureaucratic and lack transparency. Patients will be
refused for reasons that are difficult to ascertain and so difficult to challenge, and it will
not be possible to obtain or challenge decisions within the time that the medical condition
necessitates. In order to minimise the obstacles to treatment abroad the Court therefore
laid down a few principles, largely restatements from earlier cases, but with some
expansion.21
Firstly, the criteria for authorisation must be objective, non-discriminatory, and
known in advance, ‘in such a way as to circumscribe the exercise of the national
authorities’ discretion, so that it is not used arbitrarily’.22 This is to be a rule-based
procedure, not entirely without discretion, but that discretion is severely limited. Primary
care trusts are therefore obliged to state publicly the conditions under which they will
grant authorisation. 
The central condition is of course that domestic treatment cannot be provided
domestically without undue delay.23 However, this is hardly a precise measurement, and
its mere statement does not enable patients to know their position clearly. Therefore it
would be wise and helpful and in the spirit of the judgment for health authorities to set
out what are considered to be acceptable maximum time periods for certain common
treatments, while also stating, in order to remain in compliance with the law, that each
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situation will be assessed in the light of individual circumstances so that particular
suffering or difficulty experienced by a patient may reduce (but not increase) that
period.24 Given that these time periods are required to be based primarily on objective
clinical factors, it would obviously make sense if they were the same nationally. It would
therefore be a good idea to have central intervention or guidelines. Actually, it is hard to
think of any reason why ‘undue delay’ should vary significantly from country to country.25
It probably will, and governments will probably not look at other states in making their
determinations. However, it is certainly open to lawyers to do so when arguing for their
clients.
Secondly, the procedure must be easily accessible, decisions must be made in 
a reasonable time, and they must be challengeable in judicial or quasi-judicial
proceedings.26 In the light of the accessibility requirement it may be unreasonable to
expect patients to provide arguments or evidence from specialists. It may be that if they
make a request, and state why they feel they need treatment more quickly, it is for the
authority to arrange a speedy and independent medical assessment of their situation. It
may be difficult and/or expensive for individual patients to have to accumulate reports
from specialists to support their case.
This raises another important issue. The Court found that courts faced with
challenges to decisions must be able to seek the advice of objective and impartial experts.27
The clear point here is that doctors who may have personal or institutional loyalty to the
authority making the decision should not have the last word. It may be that professional
ethics require doctors to make objective individual assessments even if these result in a
decision which is expensive and undesirable for their employer or the institution where
they work, or even for other patients on a waiting list. Nevertheless, the reality is that
pressure can be exerted to interpret medical necessity in a particular way and—the greater
risk—there can also be an institutional culture which takes a particular view of what is
acceptable and what is not. The Court wants to get away from the question of what
Bedford PCT thinks is acceptable, and move towards the question of what modern
medical science thinks is acceptable.28 This may entail evidence from experts who clearly
have no affiliations that might complicate their position. There is also no reason why the
evidence of NHS doctors should take precedence over the opinions of the foreign doctors
to which the patient wishes to go.29
The impact of this may be significant. The High Court and the UK government may
take the view that three to four months of constant pain does not comprise an undue
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delay, but it is hard to see how that view can be supported if one looks from a medical and
personal point of view, rather than thinking about the institutional interests of Bedford
PCT or the NHS as a whole, or about what is normal in the UK. Most people, most
doctors in the developed world, and many Member States, would regard it as unacceptable
to leave anyone in constant pain for a third of a year. It will not be difficult to find eminent
medical experts to testify that someone in Mrs Watts’ position should have had her
operation within days or weeks, and that any delay risked further harm to her health.
Indeed, the fact that her health did deteriorate between the initial assessment in October
and that in February may indicate that even these three or four months did in fact, in
retrospect, comprise an undue delay. In short, if courts have to look at the medical needs
of patients rather than the structural needs of the NHS then an entire national medical
culture, which has somehow come to find that it is normal and acceptable to wait in pain
and disability for months for treatment, may find itself under attack. 
The Extent of Reimbursement: How Much does the NHS have to Pay?
The final major issue in the case concerned the cost of the treatment. Even if the NHS was
in principle liable for the costs of treatment abroad, there remained questions concerning
the precise extent of this. 
A minor issue was the ancillary costs of treatment abroad, such as travel and lodging.
The Court found that a state is only obliged to reimburse these where it reimburses
equivalent costs for those being treated domestically.30 This means that there will remain
a cost burden for those being treated abroad, and in some circumstances a significant
one, since one may expect travel and ancillary costs to be higher, and domestic coverage
of equivalent costs is unlikely to be complete.
Regarding the costs of the medical treatment itself, the starting point is that under
Regulation 1408/71 patients authorised to receive treatment abroad are entitled to the
same benefits-in-kind as those insured in that country.31 Thus if French patients (or their
insurance companies) only have to pay 25% of the cost of their treatment to their
providers, the same would apply to Mrs Watts. The French state or health authority,32
which foots the rest of the bill, is entitled to claim reimbursement of this from the UK via
a long-established procedure laid down in Regulation 1408/71. This takes place entirely
without any reference to UK tariffs or costs of treatment.33 Similarly, if a citizen of another
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Member State received authorisation from their home state to come to the UK for
treatment, then since the NHS provides treatment free to its patients—it is an entirely
benefit-in-kind system—he or she would also receive free treatment, with the difference
that the NHS would subsequently bill his or her home state.
However, in many countries hospital treatment is not provided on a benefit-in-kind
basis. A large part, or the whole, of the cost of the treatment is paid to the provider by the
patient or their insurer. The migrant patient therefore receives a bill, as did Mrs Watts. The
obligation of the home state towards this bill is not covered by Regulation 1408/71, and
is decided by Article 49 and free movement of services. Consistently with this, the guiding
principle is non-discrimination between domestic and foreign services, and the obligation
of the home state towards the bill depends on the nature of domestic coverage. The
general approach is that the principles of domestic coverage must be applied to that bill.
Thus, if the domestic system provides treatment entirely free of charge, as in the UK, then
the prima facie obligation is to reimburse entirely any bill that the patient receives (or of
course pay it directly).34
However, in an important restriction the Court found that the UK obligation to Mrs
Watts could not take its total liability above the cost of the equivalent treatment under the
NHS.35 Thus if the operation would have cost the NHS three thousand pounds, and the
UK was liable to the French authorities for two thousand pounds under the Regulation
1408/71 procedure, then it would be obliged to pay Mrs Watts no more than one thousand
pounds, even if the bill that she in fact received was greater. To decide otherwise, the Court
found, would be to entitle patients going abroad to greater coverage than those staying at
home.36
This is a very insurance-minded perspective. One could just as well argue, as Mrs
Watts did, that since the NHS covers the cost of domestic treatment in full then the
obligation should be to cover the cost of foreign treatment in full too. Bearing in mind
that a patient is only given authorisation to go abroad when the domestic system fails to
treat them within a medically acceptable timeframe it is hard to see why they should be
penalised financially. There is an interesting tension here between the patient-centred
smooth co-ordination approach under Regulation 1408/71, which dictates that the home
state pays for the foreign treatment at the foreign rate, and if that is expensive it is bad
luck, and the fair trade approach under Article 49, which says that the cover for foreign
treatment should be no less, but also no greater, than that extended to the domestic
equivalent. They complement each other in a sometimes inconsistent way; the patient
who goes to a very expensive state which provides benefits-in-kind may receive treatment
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that is more expensive than the domestic equivalent but his home state will still have to
pay, as it will fall within Regulation 1408/71. On the other hand, if he receives the same
treatment, at the same cost, in a state with an insurance-based system, and is billed for it,
then he will receive reimbursement only up to the UK cost.
How important this limit is in practice depends partly on the relative costs of UK
and foreign treatment. It may be that the cost of treatment within the NHS is relatively
high compared with that in many other Member States, in which case the limit may not
often bite. The more important effect of the limit may turn out to be the pressure that it
exerts on the NHS to quantify the cost of the treatments that it provides. Under the
current system of public funding of hospitals it may not always be possible to say what
the cost is of a given operation, or at least the authorities may not know.37 Alternatively,
where the NHS does attribute costs to particular procedures these may be highly
challengeable; have they fairly factored in infrastructural costs, for example? Were the
NHS to price its operations using only marginal cost (the cost of every additional
operation) and not considering also the broader cost of creating and operating a hospital,
this might make prices, and therefore reimbursement, artificially low.
In order to avoid having to write a blank cheque to every patient going abroad, the
NHS does now need to establish the costs of medical procedures. Further, these costs
need to be objectively and transparently established and made publicly available. Not
only will they be relevant to the patient’s choice of destination country, but the extent of
reimbursement should be seen as falling within the procedural obligations discussed
above, and must therefore be knowable in advance.
However, fixing a price is likely to be a process open to legal challenge and involving
many controversial and difficult assessments. Indeed, part of the economics and logic of
a national health system is that budgeting is not done in terms of the cost of each
procedure, and that this does create certain efficiencies. Once each treatment is attributed
a price, the behaviour and organisation of the NHS is likely to become significantly more
like that of private-sector or insurance funded medical providers.38
Consequences for Private Health Care Providers in the UK
Finally, one may note that Watts may have a major impact on these private providers. If
the NHS is obliged to pay for a patient to go abroad for treatment then it seems petty
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and nonsensical to refuse to pay for them to be treated at a private UK hospital, simply
because this is an internal situation and Community law does not apply. It is perhaps not
surprising that the UK government’s policy of using private hospitals to reduce waiting
lists has developed since the late 1990s in parallel with the flow of European judgments
on free movement of patients. One possible effect of Watts is that patients will receive
authorisation to go abroad, and then obtain consent to in fact have the replacement
treatment done at a private hospital in the UK. Why should Bedford PCT care, if the cost
to them is no greater and they have to pay for the treatment outside their own hospital
anyway?
Perhaps they should care because of the risk of the flow increasing dramatically. While
many patients may choose to wait rather than going abroad, the option of being treated
domestically and privately will be more attractive. Seeking authorisation for foreign
treatment might, depending on the state of waiting lists, be a way of leveraging quicker
private treatment at home. From the other side, an increase in the number of patients
being treated at public expense in private institutions in the UK may encourage foreign
health care providers to establish institutions in the UK. Pressure for increased private
provision may then come from the provider side too, using their capacity to reduce
waiting lists as a public relations tool.39
Conclusions
There are several themes in which Watts plays a part. One is the liberalising pressure of
free movement, which leads to the restructuring of public institutions. Community law
has received much criticism for its alleged imposition of market philosophy in this way.40
Perhaps one should note however that Watts and the cases which precede it only affect UK
hospitals insofar as they are unable to provide treatment without undue delay. If the NHS
offered operations within a time corresponding to patients’ medical needs, Watts would
have no effect.
The second theme is the gradual development of social rights in Community law, in
an attempt to balance the claimed market bias. It will be suggested that Watts almost
establishes a right to adequate medical care—if your state cannot provide it then it must
pay for you to have it elsewhere.41 This is not a right written into many constitutions, and
it is controversial whether the Community should be the source of it, but nor is it
something that is easy to reject. 
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Thirdly, and most importantly in practice, the Court’s emphasis on legalisation of
the relationship between patient and domestic institution will create a flurry of law suits.
In emphasising the obligation on the institution to be objective and transparent, and the
right of the patient to access practical and accessible enforcement mechanisms, the Court
is on the one hand continuing the Community law emphasis on domestic enforcement,
which has been a theme of recent years, and on the other aligning itself with broader
social trends towards individual empowerment against the state.
Lastly, the relatively unusual level of detail in Watts suggests that the case law has
reached a point of maturity where we might expect it to be translated into legislation,
and sure enough a proposal from the Commission on patients’ rights and mobility is
expected in 2007 and discussion regarding co-ordination of health systems via the OMC
or legislation has taken off at Community level.42 It will be interesting to see whether this
turns out to be a first step towards wider Community harmonisation in the cause of a
European-wide market for health care services.43 That would have complex and politically
difficult effects on the social, economic and medical aspects of health care provision, as
well as on broader European integration and society.44
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